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In this note, a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents who behave strategically 
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1 Introduction 
Strategic behaviour does not yield, in general, the same result that is obtained under price-
taking behaviour. However, recent work, such as Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993), suggests 
that in continuum economies some other notions of equilibrium, than the competitive one, may 
lead to identical results . 
In the present note, we consider a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents who 
behave strategically. Following Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), a notion af equilibrium, called 
strategic equilibrium, is defined. Our main objective is an attempt at a comparative study 
with respect to perfect competition models. 
For this purpose, we analyse several situations according to the definition of a strategies 
set. First, the strategies are endowments and preferences. Second, the strategies are only en-
dowments, keeping preferences invariant; this may be interpreted as a situation where goods 
are burnt to increase prices, such as the case of coffee in Brasil. Third, we consider an in-
termediate situation, where strategies are basically recourses. This last case covers the model 
developped by Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993); the same equivalence result is obtained, 
without imposing any restriction in the structure of initial holdings and without assuming 
uniqueness of equilibrium while generalizing the set of strategies. It is proved that the set of 
strategic equilibrium allocations coincides with the set of competitive allocations; in particular, 
true characteristics is a strategic equilibrium profile. Therefore, this note can be interpreted 
as a justification (slightly different from usual) for the assumption of competitive behaviour in 
continuum economies, which have been termed as perfectly competitive economies. 
In section 2 we present the model, state the notations and introduce the strategic equilibrium 
concept. Section 3 is concerned with the main result. Some applications are provided in section 
4. Section 5 is the conclusion. 
2 The Model 
Consider a pure exchange economy £, with a continuum of agents represented by the real 
interval f = [0,1]. Every consumption set is 3?~, where f represents the number of different 
commodities traded in the market. Each agent t E f is characterized by his initial endowment 
Wt and his preference relation on his consumption set Xt = 3?~, represented by a continous 
utility function Ut : Xt -+ 3? Thus, the economy £ is specified by endowments and utilities 
(Wt, Ut), for all agent t E f. 
An allocation is a j.l-integrable function x : f -+ ~+. An allocation x is said to be feasible 
if J1x(t)dj.l ~ J1 Wtdj.l, where j.l denotes the Lebesgue measure on the Borel subsets of f. A 
competitive (or walrasian) equilibrium for the economy £ is a pair (p*, x*), consisting of a 
non zero price system p* E ~ and a feasible allocation x*, such that for almost all t E f, 
x*(t) E Bt(p*) = {x E ~~ : p*x ~ p*wtl and Bt(p*) n{ x E ~ : Ut(x) > Ut(x*(t)) } = 0. 
Let us suppose that individuals behave strategically. Given the set of agents f of an ex-
change economy, characterized by their initial holdings and preferences; we can say that the 
strategies are misrepresentations of these characteristics and, therefore, misrepresentations of 
their supplies. Thus, given the exchange economy £,let the set of strategies for an individual 
t E f be et = {(et, UOt ), such that 0 ~ et ~ Wt and, UOt : Xt -+ ~ is continous}. So, an agent 
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t E I of characteristics (Wt, Ut) can claim to be of any other characteristic in et, i.e., he can 
send to the market not his whole holdings but a fra.ction, and he can also announce another 
utility function, which differs from his real one. However, the consumption set is invariant. 
A strategy profile is a mapping 0 : I - UtEI et, which associates to each agent t E I a 
strategy O(t) = (Ot, UOl) E et. In this sense, agents can affect economies that differ from the 
initial one £. Let £0 be the virtual economy which effects if individual declare a strategy profile 
0, that is, £0 = (Xt = ~~, (Ot, UOl)' t El) . 
An allocation mechanism is a mapping that associate to each possible economy a feasible 
allocation. A mechanism f is said to be incentive compatible individually if given any initial 
economy £, it's satisfied that for almost all t E I, Ut(ft(£)) ~ Ut(ft(£O(t))), for every O(t) E et, 
where £O(t) denotes the economy which coincides with £ except for one agent t E I, who should 
be characterized by (Ot, UOl), instead of (Wt, Ut), and ft(£) denotes the allocation received by 
the individual t in the economy £. Let f be an allocation mechanism such that, given a virtual 
economy £0, f(£o) is a Walrasian allocation for £0' 
As it is shownn in the next section, we deal with economies for which there exists a com-
petitive equilibrium. Given the possibilities of multiple equilibrium, some selection can be 
prescribed in order to define the mechanism f correctly. Following Roberts (1980), and for 
convenience of analysis and notation, f is defined in a way such that prices change by the 
smallest amount necessary to restore equilibrium. That is, f is required to satisfy the following 
property: if (p, x) is competitive equilibrium of the basis economy £ and we define x = f( f), 
then, given any other economy £', x' = f(£') ifthere exists p' such that (p',x') is Walras equi-
librium of £' and lip' - pll 5 lip" - pI! for all p" Walras equilibrium prices of £'; in other case 
the mechanism selects any competitive allocation for £'. This selection is justified in the final 
remarks. However, as it may be noticed in the proof of theorem 1, the price that minimize the 
distance to a previous one not only exists but is unique. 
\Vith this approach, we denine a strategic equilibrium for the economy £ as a pair consisting 
of a strategy profile 0* and a feasible allocation x*, such that x*(t) = x(t) + Wt - 0;, with 
x walrasian allocation for the apparent economy £0', where 0* verifies that no set of agents 
of positive measure can benefit from deviating unilaterally. Note, that for all £0 we have 
x(t) = ft(£o) +Wt - Ot as a feasible allocation for the basis economy £. Towards defining the 
notion of strategic equilibrium formally, let us denote by £O\O'(t) the economy which coincides 
with £0, except for one agent t E I, who declares characterists (O~,Uo:). 
Definition 1 . A strategic equilibrium for the economy £ is a pair (0*, x*), where 0* zs a 
strategy profile and x* is a feasible allocation, such that 
a) x* can be written as x*(t) = ft(£o') +Wt - 0;, and 
b) Ut(x*(t)) ~ Ut(ft(£o'\O(t)) +Wt - Ot), for all O(t) E et, for almost all tEl. 
Let us suppose that the equilibrium profile 0* is given by the true characteristics and define 
the mechanism g by 9t(£0) = ft(£o) +Wt - Ot. It is worth noting that, in this case, condition b) 
is equivalent to the individual incentive compatibility of 9. 
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3 The Main Result 
We are interested in showing that in the stated situation the set of strategic equilibrium alloca-
tions coincides with the set of competitive allocations. Let us suppose that the initial economy 
£ verifies the assumptions stated by Aumann (1964) for existence of competitive equilibrium 
in continuum economies 
(H.1) fl WtdJ.l >> 0, i.e., the total endowment is strictly positive in every component, 
(H.2) the utility functions are strictly monotone, and 
(H.3) the functions Ut(x) are measurable in x and t with respect to the compact-open topology. 
In order to guarantee the existence of competitive equilibrium for every apparent economy, 
denote by A(£) the set of economies £0 that agents can create with () admissible strategy profile. 
A strategy profile () is said to be admissible ifthe utility functions Uo, verify (H.2) and (H.3), and 
fl ()tdJ.l >> O. So, if £0 E A(£) we can assert that £0 satisfy the hypothesis above and, therefore, 
the mechanism f is well defined on A(£). Under this assumptions we can state the main result. 
If (p*, x*) is a competitive equilibrium for the economy £, there exists a strategy profile ()*, 
such that (()*,x*) is a strategy equilibrium; conversely, if (()*,x*) is a strategic equilibrium for 
the economy £, there exists p* such that (p*, x*) is a Walras equilibrium. 
Theorem 1 . x* is a competitive equilibrium allocation for the economy £ if and only if x* is 
a strategic equilibrium allocation for the economy £. 
Proof. Let (p*, x*) be a competitive equilibrium for the economy £. Denote by ()* the strategy 
profile which associates to each agents his true characteristics. i.e., ()*(t) = (Wt, Ut) and £0. = £. 
Defining the auxiliary mechanism gas gt(£o) = ft(£o)+Wt -()t one obtains x*(t) = ft(£) = gt(£). 
Let us first show that 9 is incentive compatible individually, which in this situation is equivalent 
to condition (b) in definition 1 and, consequently we could conclude that (()*, x*) is strategic 
equilibrium for £. To this end, associated to each economy £0 E A(£) and to each agent t E I, 
let us define the set Bo,(p(())) = {x E ~~ such that p(())x ::; p(())()tl, where p(()) is a competitive 
equilibrium price system for the economy £0. Consider p(()*) = p* and f(£o.) = x*. Because 
J.l is atomless, we have that p* is also walrasian price system for the economy £o·\O(t) = £O(t)J 
whatever caharacteristic ()(t) E et declared by the agent t may be. So, we can state (p*, f(£o(t))) 
walrasian equilibrium for £O(t). Clearly, we also have Bo,(p*) ~ Bt(p"), for all ()t ::; Wt . By 
definition of f and the sets Bo, (p( ())), one obtains that the allocation ft(£o(t)) +Wt - ()t E Bt(p*), 
for all ()(t) E et, for almost all tEl. Therefore, since ft(£) maximizes Ut in Bt(p*) for almost all 
t E I, we can conclude that Ut(Jt(£)) ~ Ut(Jt(£O(t))+Wt -()t) = Ut(gt(£O(t))) for all ()(t) E et, for 
almost all t E I, what this means is that 9 es incentive compatible individually. Consequently, 
the pair consisting of the strategy profile define by the true characteristics an the allocation x* 
is a strategic equilibrium. 
Reciprocally, let (()*, x*) be a strategic equilibrium for the economy £. By definition one has 
x*(t) = ft(£o·) +Wt - ();, and Ut (Jt(£o·) +Wt - ();) ~ Ut (Jt(£o.\8(t)) +Wt - ()t), for almost all 
t E I and whatever ()(t) E et may be. Let p(()*) be the equilibrium price system associated with 
f(£o.). Consider p* = p(()*); and let us show that (p*,x*) is a competitive equilibrium for £. 
Since ft (£0.) E Bo:(p*) for almost all t El, we have x"(t) = ft (£0. )+Wt - (); E Bt(p*) for almost 
all tEl. It remains to be shown that x*(t) is a maximal element in the budget set Bt(p*) for 
almost all t El. Suppose, it is not so. Then there exists S ~ I, with J.l( S) > 0 and there exist 
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consumption vectors x(t) E Bt(p·), such that Ut(x(t)) > Ut(x·(t)) for all agent t in S. The 
strategy profile rr must verify (i) O·(t) = (wt, Ud, for all t E S' C S, with It(S') > 0, or (ii) 
O·(t) :I (Wt, Ut), for almost all t E S. If (i) occurs, one obtains Ut(x(t)) > Ut (Jt (£0· )) for almost 
all t E S, but then (P., f( £0. )) would not be walrasian equilibrium for the economy £0•. Which 
is not in accordance with the definition of f and is contrary to condition (a) in the definition 
of strategic equilibrium. If (ii) occurs, let us consider the strategy O(t) = (Wt, Ut) for almost 
all t E S. As was mentioned earlier p. is also a competitive equilibrium price for the economy 
£o·V(t). Thus, we can state f(£o.V(t)) as a competitive allocation with prices p•. Then, since 
x(t) E Bt(p·) for almost all t E S, we have Ut(Jt(£o.'O(t))) ~ Ut(x(t)) > Ut (Jt (£0· ) + Wt - 0;) 
for almost all t E S. Which is contrary to condition b) in the strategic equilibrium definition. 
Q.E.D. 
It is worth noting that this result depends critically on the continuum assumption. As in 
continuum economies an individual has no ability to influence price formation and has no gains 
from non-competitive behaviour. Furthermore, in atomless economies the influence of each 
agent (or of a set of measure zero) is null because the integral does not change if the behaviour 
of such set of agents is altered. However, this does not happen in finite economies and the 
equilvalence result does not hold if a finite set of agents is considered. In fact, an example 
similar to which appears in Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993) can be stated to show that in 
finite economies the strategic equilibrium may differ from the competitive outcome. 
4 Some Applications 
In this note we have formalized a model of a pure exhange economy, with a continuum of 
agents who behave strategically in their endowments and preferences. However other strategic 
behaviour can be considered. For example, that strategies are only endowments and preferences 
are invariant. Even an intermediate situation can be analized, with strategies consisting of 
.' endowments and preferences. The latter determined by the former and by true preferences. 
Nevertheless, both examples lead to the same result. As we show below, they are applications 
of the main result obtained in the previous section. 
First, let us suppose that the set of strategies for each agent t E I is reduced to et = 
{Ot E X t,such thaWt ~ wtl, keeping utility functions Ut fixed. Now the strategies are not pairs 
consisting of endowments and preferences but only recourses. Thus, we may write O(t) = Ot. 
Let us also assume that the initial economy £ satisfies assumptions (H.l), (H.2) and (H.3), 
which assert the existence of competitive equilibrium. In this case a strategy profile is said to 
be admissible if it verifies (H.1). In this way, we can state (as a particular case of theorem 1) 
that x· is a competitive allocation for the economy £ if and only if x· is a strategic equilibrium 
allocation for the economy £. For this, it is sufficient to realize that (in this case) the equilibrium 
profile O· verifies either 0; = Wt, for almost all t E SOl' 0; :I Wt and for almost all t E S. 
Given that agents declare their true preferences, one can interpret that they misrepresent 
their holdings not to consume but only to impact on prices. This suggests that condition b) in 
definition 1 may be replaced by condition (b') Ut (Jt (£0· )) ~ Ut(Jt(£o.'O(t))), for all O(t) E et, 
for almost all tEl. If so, the equivalence result does not alter because the first part of the 
proof would be reduced to show the incentive compatibility of competitive mechanism f, and the 
second one follows immediately, taking into account that ft(£o) E Bt(p(O)), whatever strategy 
profile 0 may be. It is interesting to note that this first application provides explicit economic 
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interpretations. It represents situations where commodities, as was in our earlier example, are 
burnt. It is known that there are countries and regions where the excess of productivity leads 
to the owners to throwaway part of the output in order to increase prices. That is how it 
happens, for example, with coffee in Brasil and with cherries in Jerte Valley (Spain). 
Let us now consider the intermediate situation, where the set of strategies for each agent t E I 
is defined by et = ((Ot,Uo,), such that 0 ~ Ot ~ Wt and Uo,(x) = Ut(x+Wt -Ot), with x E 
X t = ~~}. This can be interpreted as follows; if an individual declares endowments Ot, then 
he will say that his utility function is the true one evaluated on what he receives plus what 
he hides. As above, the initial economy £ is required to satisfy (H.!), (H.2) and (H.3). Note, 
that the utility functions Uo, satisfy (B.2) and (H.3) because the functions Ut verify both 
assumptions. Therfore, in order to guarantee the existence of competitive equilibrium in all 
apparent economies it is sufficient to say that a strategy profile is admissible if it verifies (H.!). 
In this intemediate situation we once more obtain that price-taking and strategic behaviour 
lead to identical results. The proof is just like the one stated for theorem 1. 
Observe, that this situation covers the model described by Codognato and Gabszewicz 
(1993). In such a model there are a continuum of agents who behave strategically and a 
continuum of agents who behave as price-takers. The former are called oligopolists and all of 
them manipulate the market for the same single good. The structure of initial endowments 
prevents them from acting strategically on the others, since they do not share the ownership 
of other goods. As it was mentioned in the introduction, under uniqueness of equilibrium and 
defining endowments as strategies, they show that the set of Cournot-Walras equilibrium coin-
cides with the set of Walras equilibrium. The same result is obtained here. Defining the notion 
of strategic equilibrium without restricting the structure of initial endowments and generalizing 
the set of strategies and without assuming uniqueness of competitive equilibrium. Moreover, 
we could have considered that some agents behave strategically while the others remain as 
price-takers. (As introducing agents who adopt a price-taking behaviour would not alter the 
main result.) 
Final Remarks 
We prove that in continuum economies the set of strategic equilibrium allocations coincides 
with the set of competitive allocations. Consequently, there exists strategic equilibrium if and 
only if there exists competitive equilibrium. This equivalence is stated for three different cases, 
on the basis of the stategies considered. First, the set of strategies is defined by endowments 
and preferences. Second, the strategies are only endowments. Third, the strategies are basically 
endowments. Regardless, we show that the price-taking behaviour leads to an identical result 
to that of the strategic one. 
We have worked in the commodity space ~~, but this requirement is not essential. The 
same result can be extended to the infinite dimensional case by adding the hypothesis that 
guarautees the existence of competitive equilibrium in continuum economies defined on an 
infinite dimensional commodity space. (See Khan and Yannelis (1991), ch.4). The competitive 
equilibrium is not required to be unique. The possibility of multiple equilibria justified the 
selection effected in section 2. Such a selection is made for convenience of analysis, in order to 
obtain a certain continuity, for clarity of notation, and to facilitate the proof of the main result. 
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The result obtained by Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993) is a special case of the intermediate 
situation considered in this note. The same equivalence result is obtained here but within a more 
general approach. We assume no particular structure of initial endowments, nor uniqueness 
of competitive equilibrium and the set of strategies is generalized; moreover, agents not only 
behave strategically on all goods but can trade with all of them, even with those that are 
misrepresented. In the intermediate situation it is worth emphasizing that the consumption 
sets in the economies £0 are defined by ~~. If the consumption set for an agent t E I in the 
economy £0 would be defined as X t = ~~ - Wt +Ot, then it is easy to show that (p, x) is Walras 
equilibrium for £ if and only if (p, x) is Walras equilibrium for £0, with x(t) = x(t) - Wt +Ot. 
Thus, the equilibrium price system for £ and £0 would be the same, therefore, the proof of 
theorem 1 would be reduced to show the incentive compatibility of the auxiliar mechanism 
g. Let us also point out that the definition of strategic equilibrium has been stated following 
the idea of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept introduced by Codognato and Gabszewicz 
(1993), however (as noted) both notions differ somewhat. If the initial situation is considered as 
in Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993), one obtains a single Cournot-Walras equilibrium profile 
and two strategic equilibrium profiles. One, to declare the true characteristics and the other 
to declare the competitive equilibrium supply. Both profiles resulting in the same equilibrium 
allocation. 
As is pointed out our main result does not hold in economies with a finite set of agents. In 
finite economies an agent may be able to manipulate prices to his benefit and he would then 
have an incentive to adopt non-competitive behaviour. Despite this, one would expect an ap-
proximation theorem, showing that as the number of agents increases the strategic equilibrium 
tends to the competitive equilibrium. In fact, economists typically assume that consumers in 
large economies will adopt a price-taking behaviour. This note should provide a basis for a 
more systematic study of an asymptotic version of the main result. 
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